

The CINBAD Project Update

From statistical analysis to traffic signatures

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
9th December 2008




- Statistical anomaly detection
- Transition to snort
 - Snort setup
- Findings
- Plans

- Top-down approach
 - start with all possible flows
 - divide flow into categories, e.g.
 - external/internal/network domain/network device
 - udp/tcp/icmp/others
 - static/dynamic addresses
- Analysis is challenging
 - very noisy traffic
 - many different protocols, applications
 - isolating anomalous traffic is difficult and might require payload inspection

- Example of known flows:
 - network services like dhcp, dns, ldap, kerberos, ...
 - applications like mail servers, antivirus, afs, ...
 - OS characteristic traffic like netbios, P&P, ...
- Example of the flow description:
 - <source address; dst address; protocol; src port, dst port>:
 - <dns server;*;UDP; 53; *>
 - <*, dns server; UDP; *; 53>
 - <*;*;UDP;1900;1900>
 - BUT works only with the services using standard protocols and ports




- Moving Average approach
 - Monitoring udp connections within CERN from portable hosts
 - Measuring the number of different destination addresses contacted by a give source address
 - Hosts violating a given threshold are being reported
- Top flow analysis
 - Flow table of udp connections to the outside world



average

address



#	SIG_NAME	PAYLOAD
606	CINBAD BitTorrent 1	64313A6164323A695432303A900B3E8310D2A9C1C582173EAA1ADF6D3F
607	CINBAD BitTorrent 1	64313A6164323A695432303A900B3E8310D2A9C1C582173EAA1ADF6D3F
608	CINBAD BitTorrent 1	64313A6164323A695432303A900B3E8310D2A9C1C582173EAA1ADF6D3F
609	CINBAD BitTorrent 1	64313A6164323A695432303A900B3E8310D2A9C1C582173EAA1ADF6D3F
610	CINBAD BitTorrent 1	64313A6164323A695432303A900B3E8310D2A9C1C582173EAA1ADF6D3F
611	CINBAD BitTorrent 1	64313A6164323A695432303A900B3E8310D2A9C1C582173EAA1ADF6D3F
612	CINBAD BitTorrent 1	64313A6164323A695432303A900B3E8310D2A9C1C582173EAA1ADF6D3F
613	CINBAD BitTorrent 2	64313A7264323A695432303A939F70DF1D5C16A4EB9A909EA844276F429
614	CINBAD BitTorrent 2	64313A7264323A695432303A939F70DF1D5C16A4EB9A909EA844276F429
615	CINBAD BitTorrent 1	64313A6164323A695432303A900B3E8310D2A9C1C582173EAA1ADF6D3F
616	CINBAD BitTorrent 1	64313A6164323A695432303A900B3E8310D2A9C1C582173EAA1ADF6D3F
617	CINBAD BitTorrent 1	64313A6164323A695432303A900B3E8310D2A9C1C582173EAA1ADF6D3F
618	CINBAD BitTorrent 1	64313A6164323A695432303A900B3E8310D2A9C1C582173EAA1ADF6D3F
619	CINBAD BitTorrent 1	64313A6164323A695432303A900B3E8310D2A9C1C582173EAA1ADF6D3F
620	CINBAD BitTorrent 1	64313A6164323A695432303A900B3E8310D2A9C1C582173EAA1ADF6D3F
621	CINBAD BitTorrent 2	64313A7264323A695432303AA7F3318F65FF036B3549023F311B6E2934E,
622	CINBAD BitTorrent 2	64313A7264323A695432303AA7F3318F65FF036B3549023F311B6E2934E,
623	CINBAD BitTorrent 1	64313A6164323A695432303A900B3E8310D2A9C1C582173EAA1ADF6D3F
624	CINBAD BitTorrent 1	64313A6164323A695432303A900B3E8310D2A9C1C582173EAA1ADF6D3F
625	CINBAD BitTorrent 1	64313A6164323A695432303A900B3E8310D2A9C1C582173EAA1ADF6D3F
626	CINBAD BitTorrent 1	64313A6164323A695432303A900B3E8310D2A9C1C582173EAA1ADF6D3F
627	CINBAD BitTorrent 1	64313A6164323A695432303A900B3E8310D2A9C1C582173EAA1ADF6D3F
628	CINBAD BitTorrent 1	64313A6164323A695432303A900B3E8310D2A9C1C582173EAA1ADF6D3F
629	CINBAD BitTorrent 1	64313A6164323A695432303A900B3E8310D2A9C1C582173EAA1ADF6D3F
630	CINBAD BitTorrent 1	64313A6164323A695432303A900B3E8310D2A9C1C582173EAA1ADF6D3F

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ports

same

- `simple_filter`
 - CINBAD tool based on libpcap for filtering collected data
 - Signatures can be written as pcap filter strings
- Snort
 - Rule based network traffic monitoring system
 - Rules for detecting numerous anomalies available
 - Does not work with sampled traffic out-of-the box

- Porting to work with sampled data
 - workaround for truncated payloads
 - snort rules translated into stateless ones (if applicable)
- Oracle backend
- 7000+ rules with daily updates
 - cinbad rules
 - e.g. bittorent, zatto, QQ ...
 - <http://www.emergingthreats.net>
- Internal and External traffic analysis

- Findings
 - ~45% alerts compared to the snort analysis of full traffic traces on the firewall
 - we expect this ratio to increase when we add more switches
 - internal and external traffic inspected
 - p2p file sharing applications, e.g. Bittorent, Edonkey,...
 - instant messengers, e.g. MSN, ICQ, Yahoo, ...
 - p2p streaming video, e.g. Zatto
 - two trojan likely infections
 - Password Stealer
 - Win32/Alureon.gen!J

- Password stealer
 - GET /xmfh/help1.rar, /xmfh/help.rar , /fm4/help.exe, /xmfh/mg11.txt, /xmfh/mg12.txt,
 - Identified as:
 - TrojanDropper: Win32/Frethog.k
 - PWS: Frethog.d
 - Trojan.Win32.Vaklik.ccf

- Win32/Alureon.gen!J
 - http connections to default gw with default credentials
 - GET /hpppoe.htm

- Define the normal behavior for a given network element
- Narrow the analysis domain down only to this given network element
- Report any deviation from the initial behavior description as an anomaly
 - check if this anomaly is not a part of the normal behavior

- Connections from/to switch management interfaces
 - In normal conditions there is hardly any traffic on the management interfaces (some monitoring)
 - The traffic should involve only a group of well known hosts
- Snort rule
 - `alert tcp !$SW_TALKERS any <> $SW any (msg:"CINBAD undefined TCP connection to/from switches/wireless management interface"; sid:7000012; rev:1;)`
- Findings
 - two wireless bridges that might be performing NAT

- Identify well known services (by protocol type, address, ports, etc) and exclude them from the analysis
- Monitor the behaviour of the known services for changes (bottom-up)
- Feed the anomalous traffic into the signature extraction system